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ARBITRATION OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS:
PATIENT'S DILEMMA AND DOCTOR's DELIGHT?
Stanley A. Leasure* & Kent P. Ragan**
I. INTRODUCTION
Pre-dispute arbitration agreements in medical services contracts are
becoming more common and have recently been the subject of much litiga-
tion, and even more controversy. Proponents of such agreements contend
that they constitute legitimate means to control the explosion in medical
malpractice litigation and its negative secondary effects, including skyrock-
eting malpractice premiums and a shortage of doctors in high-risk special-
ties and in certain geographic areas. Others label them unconscionable
contracts of adhesion, amounting to nothing more than mechanisms by
which doctors can overreach their patients, denying them the due process
protections afforded by the civil justice system. This controversy arises in
the context of the doctor-patient relationship, historically one of society's
most sacred and protected. It is this issue, examined in light of extant juris-
prudential, ethical and public policy considerations, which is the subject of
this Article. We urge that the real work in the resolution of these questions
should come, not from the wooden application of legal principles surround-
ing adhesion contracts, unconscionability, violation of public policy, and
all-encompassing legislation; but, rather, from the enactment, application,
and enforcement of standards of medical ethics, similar to the manner in
which the legal profession has chosen to deal with this issue.
A brief overview of the arbitral process will serve as a starting point to
the understanding of the issues involved.' Next, the statutory and common
law affecting arbitration is considered.2 Issues of contract law raised by ar-
bitration agreements in the medical malpractice context are explored in the
Article's next section.3 The ethical, societal, and practical policy considera-
tions surrounding the use of arbitration clauses in medical services con-
tracts are then examined.' Recommendations regarding the use of
arbitration in connection with these uniquely sensitive disputes and the
manner in which that use should be policed-if at all-conclude this
Article.'
* Assistant Professor of Business Law, Missouri State University; J.D. University of Tulsa
College of Law, 1980; member of the Arkansas and Oklahoma Bar Associations; Arkansas Certified
Civil Mediator; Certified Public Accountant (inactive). The authors would like to thank Ashley Newton
for her administrative assistance in the preparation of this Article.
** Associate Professor of Finance and General Business, Missouri State University; Ph.D.
University of Missouri-Columbia, 2000; Chartered Financial Analyst.
1. See infra part II.
2. See infra part III.
3. See infra part IV.
4. See infra part V.
5. See infra part VI.
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II. THE ARBITRATION PROCESS
Arbitration is a method of dispute resolution by which parties agree to
submit a dispute-either before or after it arises-to one or more neutral
third parties for binding resolution.' It is an adversarial process by which
evidence is submitted at a hearing, using relaxed rules of procedure and
evidence. Perceived advantages include savings of time and cost, confiden-
tiality, control, and enhanced potential for the preservation of the parties'
relationship.
In the United States, the resolution of medical malpractice disputes
has historically fallen within the domain of the civil litigation system. The
hallmarks of that system are high cost, delay, publicity, and unpredictable
results. Medical malpractice claims under tort-based litigation are almost
always hotly contested due to the seriousness of the injuries sustained by
the plaintiffs and the potential for excess judgments, reputational damage,
increased cost of liability insurance, and other negative secondary effects to
the physician. These issues seemed to reach their zenith in the mid-1970s-
the period of the so-called "malpractice crisis"- resulting in the enactment
of tort reform measures in a number of states and the genesis of the notion
that there must be a better way to resolve these and other claims.7 Arbitra-
tion has been identified as one means to cure some of the "evils" of medi-
cal malpractice litigation.'
III. THE LAW OF ARBITRATION
The principal federal law governing arbitration is the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act ("FAA"). Congress passed the FAA in 1925 to end persistent
judicial animosity toward the arbitral process, which manifested itself in the
refusal of the courts to enforce arbitration agreements. The essence of the
FAA is to require the courts to enforce written arbitration contracts "in-
volving commerce" or pertaining to "maritime transactions."9 The FAA
declares such agreements "valid, irrevocable and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any con-
tract."10 The FAA is widely applicable, given the United States Supreme
Court's expansive view of the term "involving commerce"." In Allied-
Bruce Terminix v. Dobson, the Supreme Court construed the statutory lan-
guage to be substantially equivalent to the very broad term "affecting"
commerce.1 The Court interpreted the "involving commerce" language as
signaling congressional intent to exercise its power in this area to the
broadest extent permissible under the Commerce Clause.1 3 Allied-Bruce
6. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
7. See Warren Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274 (1982).
8. See Thomas Metzloff, The Unrealized Potential of Malpractice Arbitration, 31 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 203 (1996).
9. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (West 2006).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273-274 (1995)
13. Id.
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Terminix was affirmed in Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., which further
broadened the applicability of the FAA, holding that the specific transac-
tion at issue need not have a "substantial effect on interstate commerce,"
as long as such transactions, taken as a whole, constitute "a general prac-
tice . . . subject to federal control."' 4
A number of states have enacted arbitration statutes. Not surpris-
ingly, some of the state provisions conflict with the FAA, giving rise to
preemption issues. The FAA contains no specific preemption of state arbi-
tration law. Accordingly, once it is determined that the FAA applies ("in-
volving commerce" or "maritime transactions"), the question is whether it
is the FAA or state law that governs. The United States Supreme Court
resolved this issue in a series of cases beginning with Prima Paint Corp. v.
Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., in which the court held that the FAA,
not state law, binds federal courts sitting in diversity." Next, in Moses H.
Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., the court held that
the FAA constituted substantive federal law applicable to arbitration
agreements involving commerce and, as such, governed in both state and
federal courts.' 6 The final step was taken in Southland Corporation v.
Keating when the United States Supreme Court held that a California stat-
ute restricting the enforceability of contractual agreements to arbitrate
conflicted with section 2 of the FAA, and was therefore void under the
Supremacy Clause."
It is important to note that the FAA does not necessarily govern all
arbitration agreements affecting interstate commerce. Under the FAA,
parties to arbitration agreements generally have the right to structure those
agreements as they wish. This includes the right to invoke state arbitration
law by specific incorporation, even if the FAA would otherwise be applica-
ble." Similarly, in circumstances not affecting interstate commerce, and in
which the FAA would not be applicable according to its terms, the parties
may mandate application of the FAA in the arbitration agreement, thereby
preempting conflicting state law.19
Once it is determined that an arbitration agreement is subject to the
terms of the FAA, a number of the FAA's procedural rules come into play
14. Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 56-57 (2003) (quoting Mandeville, Inc. v. Amer-
ican Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236 (1948)). In Covenant Health & Rehab. of Picayune, LP v.
Estate of Moulds ex rel. Braddock, No. 2007-CA-01250-COA. 2008 WL 3843820 (Miss. Ct. App. Aug.
19, 2008) the Mississippi Court of Appeals recently reiterated that an arbitration clause in a nursing
home admissions contract evidences "in the aggregate economic activity affecting interstate commerce"
thereby making the FAA applicable. Id. at 1.
15. 388 U.S. 395, 417 (1967).
16. 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
17. 465 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1984). This decision was founded on the conclusion that Congress, in
enacting the FAA, established a national policy favoring arbitration, thereby precluding the states from
requiring parties to arbitration agreements to resolve their disputes by litigation.
18. Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476
(1989).
19. Id. at 476-77; Geosurveys, Inc. v. State Nat'l Bank, 143 S.W.3d 220 (Tex. App. 2004); Hudson
v. ConAgra Poultry Co., 484 F.3d 496 (8th Cir. 2007). See generally Stanley A. Leasure, Arbitration of
Nursing Home Claims: Oklahoma Goes Its Own Way, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 737 (2007).
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as default provisions for issues not addressed in the arbitral agreement.
These include provisions for the appointment of arbitrators; summoning of
witnesses before the arbitral tribunal; and, access to court imposed sanc-
tions to compel attendance and punish recalcitrant witnesses. 20 The FAA
also vests the court with important enforcement mechanisms. The first of
these allows the entry of an order staying litigation upon a finding that the
disputed issue is subject to a written arbitration agreement.21 Likewise, a
party refusing to participate in arbitration in the face of a binding arbitra-
tion agreement is subject to the entry of an order compelling that party to
proceed with arbitration in the manner required by the agreement.2 2 The
FAA provides for a summary proceeding in such circumstances and if the
court is satisfied that an arbitration agreement has been made or that fail-
ure to comply is not at issue, the court must summarily direct the arbitra-
tion to proceed.2 3 If these issues are contested, the court is to make a
summary determination, unless a jury trial is demanded. 24 Another en-
forcement tool in the court's armamentarium is with respect to arbitral
awards. If the parties have so agreed, judgment may be entered upon an
arbitration award, thereby bringing to bear the collection and enforcement
procedures available to judgment creditors.2 5
The statutory grounds for vacatur under the FAA have been the sub-
ject of much litigation, and a detailed examination of the issue of vacatur is
beyond the scope of this article. 26 However, a brief overview of vacatur is
useful in considering the efficacy of arbitration agreements in medical ser-
vices contracts. Since the primary purpose of arbitration is to avoid litiga-
tion, it must be emphasized that the scope of review of arbitration awards
permitted by the FAA is very limited.2 7 It is also important to note that
neither legal nor factual errors are sufficient to set aside an arbitration
award. 28 The FAA provides only four circumstances in which a court may
vacate an arbitral award: (1) "the award was procured by corruption, fraud,
or undue means;" (2) "evident partiality or corruption" on the part of the
arbitrators; (3) misconduct on the part of the arbitrators by improperly "re-
fusing to postpone the hearing," refusing to hear material evidence, or prej-
udicing the rights of a party; and, (4) the "arbitrators exceeded their
powers, or . . . imperfectly executed them." 29 These statutory grounds for
20. 9 U.S.C.A. § 5, 7 (West 2006).
21. Id. at § 3.
22. Id. at § 4.
23. http://att.yahoo.com/mail
24. Id.
25. 9 U.S.C.A. § 9 (West 2006). This enforcement mechanism is not exclusive. An action at law
is available as an additional means to that provided in this section of the FAA. See, e.g., Photopaint
Technologies, LLC v. Smartlens Corp., 335 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2003).
26. See generally Stanley A. Leasure, Vacatur of Arbitration Awards: The Poor Loser Problem or
Loser Pays? 29 U. ARK. LTrrLE ROCK L. REV. 489 (2007).
27. Apex Plumbing Supply, Inc. v. U.S. Supply Co., 142 F.3d 188, 193 (4th Cir. 1998).
28. NF&M Corp. v. United Steel Workers of Am., 524 F.2d 756, 759 (3d Cir. 1975).
29. 9 U.S.C.A. § 10 (West 2006). The United States Supreme Court recently ruled that the
grounds for expedited vacatur and modification specified under the FAA are exclusive and may not be
expanded by agreement of the parties. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 1396 (2008); see
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vacatur of arbitration awards are construed quite narrowly."o In addition
to the statutory grounds, some jurisdictions have adopted a few narrowly
construed common law bases upon which arbitration awards may be set
aside, including those found to be in manifest disregard of the law, contrary
to public policy, irrational, or arbitrary and capricious.3 1 The FAA also
provides three circumstances in which arbitral awards may be judicially
modified or corrected: (1) "evident material miscalculation of figures or ...
mistake in a description;" (2) an award upon a matter not submitted to the
arbitrators; or, (3) an award imperfect in form, but not affecting the
merits.32
Finally, the FAA has identified orders involving the arbitration pro-
cess from which an appeal may be taken. These include orders denying a
stay, orders compelling arbitration, and orders confirming, modifying or
vacating an award.3 3 Appeals may also be taken from interlocutory orders
granting, continuing, or modifying an injunction against arbitration, or a
final decision with respect to an arbitration that is subject to the FAA.3 4
However, no appeal may be taken from interlocutory orders granting a
stay, directing arbitration to proceed, compelling arbitration, or refusing to
enjoin arbitration subject to the FAA.
Generally modeled after the arbitration statutes of New York, the
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated the
Uniform Arbitration Act of 1956 (UAA).3 6 Most states have passed gen-
eral arbitration statutes that are typically some version of the UAA. The
also Stanley A. Leasure, Arbitration After Hall Street v. Mattel: What Happens Next?, 31 U. ARK.
LIrrLE ROCK L. REV. - (forthcoming 2009) (analyzing the Hall Street decision and its implications
for the future of arbitration).
30. MidAmerican Energy Co. v. Int'l Bd. of Elec. Workers Local 499, 345 F.3d 616, 622 (8th Cir.
2003) (stating fraud to be sufficient to justify the setting aside of an arbitration award-must have been
materially related, undiscoverable, and established by clear and convincing evidence); Forsythe Int'l
S.A. v. Gibbs Oil Co. of Tex., 915 F.2d 1017, 1022 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating undue means must be out-
come determinative and result of intentional misconduct); Olson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 51 F.3d 157 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating evident partiality or misconduct must be so pervasive as
to destroy "fundamental fairness"); Jacada (Europe), Ltd. v. Int'l Marketing Strategies, Inc., 401 F.3d
701, 712 (6th Cir. 2005) (abrogated on different grounds by Hall St., 128 S.Ct. at 1396) (an arbitrator
must be found to have exceeded his powers or so imperfectly executed them that a final and definite
award on the subject matter was not made, and arbitrator must have acted irrationally or clearly be-
yond the scope of the arbitration submission).
31. Hoffman v. Cargill, Inc., 236 F.3d 458, 462 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding that manifest disregard is
limited to circumstances where governing law is identified by the arbitrator who then proceeds to ig-
nore it); Swift Industries, Inc. v. Botany Industries, Inc., 466 F.2d 1125, 1131 (3d Cir. 1972) (holding that
irrationality suffices only when the award is completely irrational and viewed in the context of arbitra-
tion agreement); United Food & Commercial Workers' Union Local No. 655 v. St. John's Mercy Health
Sys., 448 F.3d 1030, 1033 (8th Cir. 2006) (stating that a violation of public policy is established when the
award clearly violates public policy); United Paper Workers Int'l Union v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 42-44
(1987) (stating that violation of public policy is also established when award conflicts with law and legal
precedent); Brown v. Raucher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 994 F.2d 775, 781 (11th Cir. 1990) (stating that for
an award to be arbitrary and capricious, it must exhibit "wholesale departure from the law").
32. 9 U.S.C.A. § 11(a)-(c) (West 2006).
33. Id. at § 16(a)(1).
34. Id. at § 16(b)(2), (3).
35. Id. at § 16(b)(1)-(4).
36. UNIF. ARBITRATION Acr (1956).
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UAA's drafters had several objectives, including the validation of arbitra-
tion agreements, provision of mechanisms by which the power of state
courts could be marshaled to enforce, confirm, vacate or modify arbitral
awards, and to fill gaps left in less than complete arbitration agreements. 37
It has been adopted in 28 states and the District of Columbia.3 8 The Re-
vised Uniform Arbitration Act ("RUAA") was introduced to deal with a
number of emergent issues.39  These include the determination of arbi-
trability; disclosure of matters bearing on arbitrators' partiality; immunity
of arbitrators from civil liability; authority of arbitrators to require pre-
hearing discovery and motion practice; and, the available remedies (e.g.
attorney's fees and punitive damages). 40 The RUAA has been adopted in
12 states.4 1 In addition, to augment arbitration statutes of general applica-
tion, the legislatures in a number of states have passed statutes specifically
addressing arbitration of medical malpractice cases in the 1970s and
1980s. 42
IV. THE CONTRACT ISSUES
An overarching principle of the FAA is that parties to arbitral agree-
ments may, for the most part, structure them as they choose.43 The ques-
tion of the intent to submit a particular dispute to arbitration has been the
subject of much litigation. Even in cases falling within the scope of the
FAA, state contract law is determinative.44 A two-prong test is usually ap-
plied, requiring the court to first determine whether a valid agreement to
arbitrate exists and, if so, then to decide whether the dispute in question
37. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT (1956), Prefatory Note, 2005 Main Volume.
38. The following states have adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act of 1956: Alaska, Arizona,
Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Mas-
sachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming. UNIT. ARBITRATION ACT (1956), Table of
Jurisdictions Wherein Act Has Been Adopted.
39. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT (2000), Prefatory Note, 2005 Main Volume.
40. Id.
41. Those states which have adopted the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act of 2000 are Alaska,
Colorado, Hawaii, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Ore-
gon, Utah and Washington. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT (2000), Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Act Has
Been Adopted.
42. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: ALTERNATIVES TO LITIGA-
TION, GAO HRD-92-28 (Jan., 1992) [hereinafter MEDICAL MALPRACTICE]. The States having passed
specific medical malpractice arbitration statutes include: Alabama, Alaska, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky,
North Dakota, Ohio, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia. See Kenneth A. DeVille, The Jury Is
out: Pre-Dispute Binding Arbitration Agreements for Medical Malpractice Claims, 28 J. LEGAL MED.
333 (2007). The specifics of the arbitration statutes vary from state to state, but include such matters as
procedures by which claims will be arbitrated, and a general framework for arbitration including such
matters as: size of the arbitral panel; manner of selection of arbitrators; right of revocation. See MEDI-
CAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 42.
43. Mastrobouno v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57 (1995).
44. Patterson v. Tenent Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 834 (8th Cir. 1997).
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falls within the scope of that agreement.45 Notwithstanding the strong pol-
icy of the FAA favoring arbitration, intent is the principal issue and intent
to submit a particular dispute to arbitration must be found before the
agreement will be enforced.4 6 In a medical context, patients seeking to
avoid the enforcement of medical services arbitration agreements fre-
quently claim the agreement is unconscionable on one of the following
grounds: (1) coercion; (2) absence of mutuality; (3) burdensome expense;
(4) bias of the arbitrator; or, (5) unreasonable arbitral provisions.4 7
In Covenant Health Rehabilitation of Picayune, L.P. v. Brown, the Mis-
sissippi Supreme Court addressed, in detail, the issue of the unconsciona-
bility of an arbitration provision in a nursing home agreement. 4 8 This was a
wrongful death action brought on behalf of a former resident of the defen-
dant nursing home who contended the care rendered the decedent was
grossly negligent.4 9 When suit was filed, the defendant nursing home filed
a motion to compel arbitration based on an arbitration clause contained in
the admissions agreement.50 In response, the Plaintiffs contended, inter
alia, that the arbitration clause was procedurally and substantively uncon-
scionable.s' The trial court held that the admissions agreement was not
procedurally unconscionable, but struck the arbitration provision of the ad-
missions agreement as substantively unconscionable.5 2 The nursing home
appealed.
At the outset, the Mississippi Supreme Court pointed out that it would
continue its practice of striking unconscionable contractual terms while al-
lowing the remainder of the agreement to be enforced.5 4 With respect to
the issue of substantive unconscionability, the court noted that its review
would be limited to the four corners of the agreement and that a finding of
per se unconscionability requires a showing that the contractual "language
significantly alters the legal rights of the parties involved and severely
abridges the damages which they may obtain."5
The Plaintiffs contended that numerous provisions of the arbitration
agreement in question were substantively unconscionable including, inter
alia: limitations on the facility's liability,56 waiver of punitive damages,"
45. Covenant Health & Rehab. of Picayune, LP v. Estate of Moulds ex rel. Braddock, No. 2007-
CA-01250-COA, 2008 WL 3843820 at 2 (Miss. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2008). Daisy Mfg. Co. v. NCR Corp.,
29 F.3d 389, 392 (8th Cir. 1994).
46. Mastrobouno, 514 U.S. at 57; ITT Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Amerishare Investors,
Inc., 133 F.3d 664, 668 (8th Cir. 1998).
47. Elizabeth K. Stanley, Parties' Defenses to Binding Arbitration Agreements in the Health Care
Field and the Operation of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 38 ST. MARY's L.J. 591, 624-625 (2007).
48. 949 So. 2d 732 (Miss. 2007).
49. Id. at 735.
50. Id. at 735-736.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 735.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 737-738 (citing Vicksburg Partners, L.P. v. Stevens, 911 S.W.2d 507, 521 (Miss. 2005)).
56. Id. at 739. The limitation of liability provision provided: "Should any claim, dispute or con-
troversy arise between the Parties or be asserted against any of the Facility's owners, officers, directors
57
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and the requirement that disputes be submitted to arbitration.18 The Mis-
sissippi Supreme Court found the limitations on liabilityS9 and the waiver
of punitive damages6 0 substantively unconscionable. Reversing the holding
of the trial court, the Supreme Court found the agreement to submit dis-
putes to arbitration under the auspices of the American Arbitration Asso-
ciation rules and procedure-after striking the offending provisions
referred to above-enforceable." The Mississippi Supreme Court con-
cluded that those portions of the admissions agreement not found to be
unconscionable should be enforced as written.62
Another example is found in Cleveland v. Mann, a case decided by the
Mississippi Supreme Court.63 In this case of first impression, the court ad-
dressed the enforceability of pre-dispute arbitration agreements between
doctor and patient.6 4 The patient sought treatment from his surgeon for a
post-surgical hernia, and at his office appointment, signed a "Clinic-Physi-
cian-Patient Arbitration Agreement." 65  After the surgical repair of his
hernia, Mann developed complications requiring a subsequent surgery.66
or employees, the settlement of thereof shall be for actual damages not to exceed the lesser of (a)
$50,000 or (b) the number of days that Resident was in the Facility multiplied times the daily rates
applicable for said Resident. This limitation of liability shall be binding on the Resident, Responsible
Party, and the Resident's heirs, estate and assigns." Id.
57. Id. at 739. The punitive damages waiver contained the following terms: "[t]he Parties hereto
agree to waive any punitive damages against each other and agree not to seek punitive damages under
any circumstances." Id.
58. Id. at 740. The arbitration clause stated: "[i]f the Resident and Responsible Party agree that
any and all claims, disputes and/or controversies between them, and the Facility or its Owners, officers,
directors or employees shall be resolved by binding arbitration administered by the American Arbitra-
tion Association and its rules and procedures. The Arbitration shall be heard and decided by one
qualified Arbitrator selected by mutual agreement of the Parties. Failing such agreement each Party
shall select one qualified Arbitrator and the two selected shall select a third. The Parties agree that the
decision of the Arbitrator(s) shall be final. The Parties further agree that the Arbitrators shall have all
authority necessary to render a final, binding decision of all claims and/or controversies and shall have
all requisite powers and obligations. If the agreed method of selecting an Arbitrator(s) fails for any
reason or the Arbitrator(s) appointed fails or is unable to act or the successor(s) has not been duly
appointed, the appropriate circuit court, on application of a party, shall appoint one Arbitrator to arbi-
trate the issue. An Arbitrator so appointed shall have all the powers of the one named in this Agree-
ment. All Parties hereto agree to arbitration for their individual respective anticipated benefit of
reduced costs of pursuing a timely resolution of a claim, dispute or controversy, should one arise. The
Parties agree to share equally the costs of such arbitration regardless of the outcome. Consistent with
the terms and conditions of this Agreement, the Parties agree that the Arbitrator(s) may not award
punitive damages and actual damages awarded, if any, shall be awarded pursuant to Section E.7." Id.
59. Id. at 738-739 (citing Vicksburg Partners, 911 So. 2d at 523 in which identical language had
been found unconscionable). See also Covenant Health & Rehab. of Picayune, LP v. Estate of Moulds
ex rel. Braddock, No. 2007-CA-01250-COA, 2008 WL 3843820, at *5 (Miss. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2008).
60. Id. at 739. See also Covenant Health & Rehab. of Picayune, LP v. Estate of Moulds ex rel.
Braddock, No. 2007-CA-01250-COA, 2008 WL 3843820, at *5 (Miss. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2008).
61. Id. at 740.
62. Id. at 741 (citing Miss. Code Ann. § 75-2-302 (1) (1972)): B.C. Rogers Poultry, Inc. v.
Wedgeworth, 911 So. 2d 483, 491 (Miss. 2005); Russell v. Performance Toyota, Inc., 826 So. 2d 719,
724-25 (Miss. 2002); Plaza Amusement Co. v. Rothenberg, 159 Miss. 800, 131 So. 350, 357 (1930).
63. 942 So. 2d 108 (Miss. 2006).
64. Id. at 113.
65. Id. at 111. The agreement provided "[p]atient agrees that in the event of any dispute, claim,
or controversy arising out of or relating to the performance of medical services . . . such dispute or
controversy shall be submitted to JAMS .... ." Id. at 113.
66. Id. at 111.
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During the course of treatment for these complications, he was diagnosed
with liver cancer and died.67 The plaintiffs brought a wrongful death action
against the surgeon and others who filed a motion to compel arbitration
and stay proceedings.68 Mann's survivors resisted arbitration, claiming, in-
ter alia, that the agreement was one into which Mr. Mann had not know-
ingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered.6 9 The trial court concluded
that the agreement was unconscionable and adhesive, and denied the mo-
tion to compel arbitration; the defendants appealed.70
After first finding the FAA applicable by virtue of the transaction's
connection to interstate commerce,71 the Mississippi Supreme Court em-
phasized that under this statute it must consider whether "legal constraints
external to the parties' agreement [e.g. fraud, duress, unconscionability]
foreclosed arbitration of the claims." 72 The Court considered both proce-
dural unconscionability (lack of knowledge, legalistic language, disparity in
sophistication or bargaining power, lack of opportunity to study the con-
tract, etc.) and substantive unconscionability (oppressive terms). The
plaintiffs claimed that the agreement was substantively unconscionable be-
cause it required that the arbitration be supplied by a specific service pro-
vider. 74  The Court found no substantive unconscionability because the
specified arbitration service was neutral and provided neutral arbitrators.7 s
The Court also held in favor of the defendants on the issue of procedural
unconscionability, based on a number of factors, including: lack of complex
language; prominent notice of the forfeiture of right to jury trial; full state-
ment and explanation of terms; provision of ample opportunity to inquire
about terms; 15 day rescission period; and, a provision allowing the patient
to make written changes for approval by the provider.76
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Cleveland, 942 So. 2d at 111.
70. Id. at 112.
71. Id. at 113 (citing Vicksburg Partners, L.P. v. Stephens, 911 So. 2d 507, 514-15 (Miss. 2005)
(holding that nursing home contracts "affect interstate commerce" and are, accordingly, within the
ambit of the FAA)).
72. Id. at 113-14; see also Covenant Health & Rehab. of Picayune, LP v. Estate of Moulds ex rel.
Braddock, No. 2007-CA-01250-COA, 2008 WL 3843820 at 4 (Miss. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2008); Rogers-
Dabbs Cheverolet-Hummer, Inc. v. Blakeney, 950 So. 2d 170, 177 (Miss. 2007); Trinity Mission of Clin-
ton, LLC v. Barber, 98 So. 2d 910 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007). Under Mississippi common law, "unconscio-
nability" is "the absence of meaningful choice on the part of the parties, together with contract terms
which are unreasonably favorable to the other party." Clevelend, 942 So. 2d at 114 (citing East Ford,
Inc. v. Taylor, 826 So. 2d 709, 715 (Miss. 2002)) (quoting Bank of Ind., N.A. v. Holyfield, 476 F.Supp.
104, 109 (S.D.Miss. 1979)); see also Entergy Miss., Inc. v. Burdette Gin Co., 726 So. 2d 1202, 1207 (Miss.
1998).
73. Cleveland, 942 So. 2d at 114.
74. Id. at 117.
75. Id. The court defined substantive unconscionability as "a one-sided agreement whereby one
party is deprived of all benefits of the agreement or left without a remedy for another party's non-
performance or breach." Id. (quoting Vicksburg Partners, 911 So. 2d at 521. The oppressiveness of
terms can also rise to the level of substantive unconscionability under Mississippi law. East Ford, 826
So. 2d at 714.
76. 942 So. 2d at 115-116 (Miss. 2006). In East Ford, 826 So. 2d at 714, the Mississippi Supreme
Court declared "procedural unconscionability" to include circumstances in which there is exhibited lack
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On the other hand, in Sosa v. Paulos the Utah Supreme Court found
the arbitration agreement procedurally unconscionable because it required
the patient to reimburse the doctor his attorney's fees if the patient recov-
ered less than half the amount claimed in the arbitration. 7 That case arose
as the result of a medical malpractice suit in which the plaintiff contended
.the doctor had committed surgical malpractice. 8 The arbitration agree-
ment was executed less than an hour before surgery when Sosa was un-
dressed and in her surgical clothing.79 The agreement was presented by a
representative acting on the doctor's behalf, and was accompanied by a
"Patient Informed Consent and Release of Claims" and a "Consent for
Use of Freeze Dried or Flesh Donor Tissue."so Sosa admitted that she
signed all of the documents without reading them, but claimed that no one
discussed the agreement with her at any time prior to its execution.8 ' The
defendant doctor moved to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration. 82
In response, Sosa contended that the agreement was unenforceable as pro-
cedurally and substantively unconscionable." The trial court agreed with
the plaintiff and denied the motion to stay.8 4
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court found the provision requiring the
patient to pay the doctor's attorneys' fees substantively unconscionable on
its face because those terms were so one-sided as to oppress and unfairly
surprise an innocent party." In addition, the Court considered the circum-
stances under which the contract was negotiated (minutes before surgery,
in a state of fear and anxiety, rushed, and without explanation) to be "sur-
rounded" by procedural unconscionability. The case was remanded to
the trial court with instructions that if the trial court determined that the
plaintiff received a copy of the agreement and was not precluded from re-
voking the agreement, then the attorneys' fee portion of the agreement
(found to be substantively unconscionable) would be severed and the re-
mainder of the agreement enforced. The appellate court further held that
if the trial court found that Sosa did not receive a copy of the agreement or
of knowledge or voluntariness, small print, legalistic language, difference in sophistication or bargaining
power and lack of opportunity to study and discuss terms.
77. 924 P.2d 357, 362-63 (Utah, 1996). The arbitration agreement provided in part: "[i]f the
arbitrators award patient less than one-half (1/2) of the amount sought by patient in arbitration, then
the patient shall be responsible for . . . payment of all expenses, costs, arbitrators' fees, and reasonable
attorney's fees incurred by physician in connection with the arbitration, including payment to physician
at the rate of $150.00 per hour for time spent by physician defending himself in connection with the
arbitration."




82. Sosa, 924 P.2d at 359.
83. Id. at 360.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 362.
86. Id. at 362-63.
87. Id. at 365.
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was precluded from exercising her right to revoke, the original determina-
tion of the trial court that the agreement was unconscionable in toto would
be affirmed. 8
In Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hospital, the California Court of Appeal re-
viewed the claim of a medical malpractice plaintiff that the arbitration
agreement he signed was void as an adhesion contract." Wheeler under-
went an angiogram at the defendant hospital and suffered serious compli-
cations, which left him a quadriplegic.90 After Wheeler filed suit, the
hospital sought the entry of an order compelling arbitration pursuant to an
arbitration clause contained in the hospital admission documents.9 1 The
plaintiffs claimed that the arbitration clause constituted an "adhesion con-
tract," which the court characterized as a "standardized contract form [ ]
offered to consumers . . . on essentially a 'take it or leave it' basis without
affording the consumer a realistic opportunity to bargain and under such
conditions that the consumer cannot obtain the desired product or services
except by acquiescing in the form contract."9 2 According to the court, the
distinctive feature of an adhesion contract is that the weaker party has no
choice of terms.9 3 The Court of Appeal held that since Wheeler was in no
position to reject the agreement, bargain, or find another hospital, the arbi-
tration clause possessed the characteristics of an adhesion contract.9 4
The court did, however, explain that the question was not merely
whether the contract was adhesive, but whether its terms exceeded reason-
able expectations or were oppressive or unconscionable. The determina-
tion of those issues, according to the court, hinged on the legitimate
expectations of the patient and the extent to which those expectations were
not met.9 6 In examining the transaction, the court recognized many indica-
tors of the patient's legitimate expectations and the extent to which those
expectations were not met.9 7 The court found valid assent lacking on these
88. Sosa, 924 P.2d at 365.
89. 63 Cal. App. 3d 345, 355 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
90. Id. at 349.
91. Id. at 350. The arbitration agreement provided in part: "Arbitration Option: Any legal claim
or civil action in connection with this hospitalization, by or against hospital or its employees or any
doctor of medicine agreeing in writing to be bound by this provision, shall be settled by arbitration at
the option of any party bound by this document in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules
of the American Arbitration Association and with the Hospital Arbitration Regulations of the Califor-
nia Hospital Association (copies available on request at the hospital admission office), unless patient or
undersigned initials below or sends a written communication to the contrary to the hospital within
thirty (30) days of the date of patient discharge. If patient, or undersigned, does not agree to the
'Arbitration Option,' then he will initial here." Id. at 351.
92. Id. at 356.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 357.
95. Wheeler, 63 Cal. App. 3d at 357.
96. Id.
97. Id. The court found those factors to include: patient had no opportunity to choose among
various conditions in admission documents so that he could secure a jury trial; patient had no realistic
choice among hospitals because he was directed to hospital by doctor and to gain admission to hospital,
he was required to sign the admission documents containing the arbitration agreement; and, contract
was signed in the stressful atmosphere of hospital admitting room without any procedures calculated to
alert the patient to existence of "arbitration option." Id.
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facts.9 8 In the court's view, the public policy concerns precluding the en-
forcement of adhesion contracts trumped public policy considerations
favoring arbitration.99
V. THE POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
That medical care providers believe that the American system of tort
litigation has contributed to problems with the cost, quality, and availabil-
ity of medical care is an understatement. The providers aver the existence
of a causal relationship between this broken system and increased costs for
medical care, escalation of malpractice premiums, and physicians leaving,
or declining to enter, high-risk specialties. 00 The American Medical Asso-
ciation has identified one-third of states as in full-blown medical liability
crisis.'o' According to the AMA and several studies, litigation anxiety
linked with increased insurance premiums results in the practice of defen-
sive medicine and the avoidance of high-risk specialties.10 2 Some contend
that certain parts of the country suffer from physician shortages as a result
of this issue. 0 ' One mechanism considered in an attempt to ameliorate
this problem is the use of pre-dispute arbitration clauses. 104 A study con-
ducted by Rolph, et al. examined the reasons medical care providers did or
did not use pre-dispute arbitration agreements.10 5 They found that HMOs
using arbitration on a frequent basis did so because they considered arbi-
tration to be quicker, cheaper, and less likely than litigation to yield ex-
treme results.106 The researchers found no medical malpractice insurance
carriers to have required pre-dispute arbitration agreements. However,
one carrier that did encourage such agreements cited reduced costs, time-
savings for the insured physicians, availability of knowledgeable adjudica-
tors, and reduced defense costs as potential benefits. 0 On the other hand,
a major California insurer that did not encourage the use of arbitration
agreements concluded that under California tort reform measures, better
results were obtainable in court. Another carrier indicated that its share-
holder doctors believed such agreements were detrimental to the doctor-
patient relationship. 0 s
The central players on the other side of this debate, who advance their
position just as zealously, are the trial lawyers:
98. Id. at 366.
99. Id. at 356.
100. Emily Chow, Health Course: An Extreme Makeover of Medical Malpractice with Potentially
Fatal Complications, 7 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & Emics 387, nn.2-5 (2007).
101. Id. at 388-89.
102. Id. at 389.
103. Id.
104. Barry Meier, In Fine Print, Customers Lose Ability to Sue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1997, at Al.
105. Elizabeth Rolph, Eric Moller and John E. Rolph, Arbitration Agreements in Healthcare:
Myths and Reality, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 153, 176 (1997).
106. Id. at 176.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 176-77.
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Arbitration clauses can put unwitting consumers at the
mercy of a biased decision maker who is not bound to fol-
low the law and who is often in an inconvenient place.
Key points of interest to litigators are that claimants appear
to suffer significant economic loss when their fundamental
constitutional right to jury trial is waived and that claimed
social benefits of mandatory arbitration are illusory."o9
Some of the specific points urged by the plaintiffs' trial bar in opposi-
tion to the view of arbitration as a cure-all include: arbitration does not
necessarily reduce cost;1 o the phenomenon of "repeater bias;""' the men-
ace to many societal interests arising from the secret resolution of signifi-
cant disputes with potentially far reaching effects;112 and, pre-dispute
arbitration agreements being forced on unwitting patients with no real
choice." 3 Detractors also claim that the informality of arbitration has the
effect of insulating the arbitrator's errors from all meaningful review.114 In
this same vein, they point out that arbitration's informality leads to trun-
cated discovery and abbreviated evidentiary presentations, which impair
the rights of the patient who is saddled with the burden of proof on both
liability and damages." 5 Others argue that patient consent is, at best, illu-
sory and, at worst, patently nonexistent."16
A number of studies, including one conducted by the Private Adjudi-
cation Center of the Duke Law School, have attempted to identify the fre-
quency and efficacy with which arbitration has been implemented in
medical malpractice cases. In the Duke study, 19 medical malpractice cases
were decided by arbitration. The consensus was that the resolution of
these disputes was efficient from the perspectives of both time and eco-
nomics." 7 The frequency of the use of arbitral provisions in medical ser-
vices contracts was the subject of a Rand study in California."' This study
found that these agreements were being used on a routine basis by only 9%
109. John Vail, Defeating Mandatory Arbitration Clauses, 36 TRIAL 70, 70-71 (Jan. 2000).
110. Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference
for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 694 n.318 (1996).
111. Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. & EMP.
POL'Y J. 189, 190 (1997) (arguing that to be financially successful, arbitrators must favor corporate
entities which regularly use arbitration clauses and regularly retain the services of arbitrators).
112. Pacific Gas & Elec. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986).
113. Broughton v. Cigma Healthplans, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 431 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998), affd in part &
rev. in part, 988 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999).
114. Kenneth A. DeVille, The Jury is Out: Pre-Dispute Binding Arbitration Agreements for Medi-
cal Malpractice Claims, 28 J. LEGAL MED. 333, 366 (2007); see also, Stanley A. Leasure, Vacatur of
Arbitration Awards: The Poor Loser Problem or Loser Pays? 29 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 489
(2007).
115. DeVille, supra note 99, at 369.
116. Id. at 379 (citing Jeffrey W. Stempel, Bootstrapping and Slouching Toward Gomorrah, Arbi-
tral Infatuation and the Decline of Consent, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1381, 1395 (1996)).
117. Thomas B. Metzloff, The Unrealized Potential of Malpractice Arbitration, 31 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 203, 223-24 (1996).
118. See Rolph, Moller and Rolph, supra note 90, at 153.
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of the hospitals and doctors with about 20% of the overall admissions to
hospitals being subject to such agreements.1 1 9 When asked their reasons
for using such agreements, physicians identified conformity with practice
group policy (31%) and cost effectiveness (34%).120 Almost all reported
satisfaction with their decision to utilize these agreements. 1 2 1 The United
States General Accounting Office has also presented the results of a survey
of medical malpractice claims arbitrated under a Michigan statute during
the period November 1976-March 1991. During the timeframe surveyed,
882 claims were made of which 222 (25%) were withdrawn or administra-
tively closed without a hearing; 331 (38%) settled without a hearing; 272
(31%) resulted in panel decisions; and 57 (6%) remained open at the end
of the period studied.1 2 2 Of those claims resulting in a panel decision, 72
(26%) resulted in payments ranging from $250 to $1,700,000.123
VI. CONCLUSION
The debate over the regulation of health care in the United States is
not going away. One part of that debate involves identifying who should
decide when a patient's injury has been caused by a deviation from the
medical standard of care and determining the amount of damages. For sev-
eral decades, the medical establishment has felt under siege from tort litiga-
tion. It blames this system for many things including: escalating
malpractice premiums, the practice of defensive medicine, and the lack of
necessary medical care in areas experiencing a "malpractice crisis" or for
those in need of practitioners in "high risk" specialties such as neurosur-
gery and obstetrics. One way some healthcare providers have attempted to
address the "litigation crisis" is through the use of pre-dispute arbitration
clauses. The nature of the physician-patient relationship gives rise to seri-
ous questions about the propriety of such agreements and, if used, how
they should be implemented or restricted.
Trial lawyers, consumer advocates, and others suspicious of the health-
care industry's motives contend that subjecting patients to pre-dispute arbi-
tration agreements amounts to nothing more than an attempt to deny-to
those who need it most-access to the American civil justice system. They
say that most of the time, such agreements are not the result of a meeting
of the minds between the patient and the healthcare provider, but instead
the result of adhesion contracts with unconscionable terms, designed to
thwart the legitimate rights of the patient.
Historically, these agreements have been primarily regulated under
the common law of adhesion contracts, unconscionability, public policy,
119. Id. at 171.
120. Id. at 174.
121. Rolph, Moller and Rolph, supra note 90, at 175; see also Ann H. Nevers, Medical Malpractice
Arbitration in the New Millennium: Much Ado About Nothing?, 1 PEPP. Disp. RESOL. L. J. 45 (2000).
122. MEDICAL MALPRACFICE, supra note 42.
123. Id. Those claims going to panel decision took an average of 23 months to resolve and ranged
from three to 114 months in duration.
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and sometimes by specific statutory provisions. The ability of patients to
establish unconscionability, violation of public policy or unenforceability
usually proves difficult. Frequently, the presence of genuine assent cannot
be seriously argued when the patient executed a medical services agree-
ment. This is particularly true considering the patient signs away meaning-
ful judicial oversight, the constitutional right to a jury trial, and agrees to a
system that significantly alters procedural rights.
Analogies have been drawn to the law of commerce. There, genuine
assent by the weaker party to the terms of a form contract-which is con-
cededly absent-is accepted because that party agrees to "unknown terms,
relying on the good faith of the dominant party," all in the name of elimi-
nating detailed bargaining.124 These contracts are sometimes justified with
the claim that they produce the same societal benefits resulting from the
standardization of goods and services.12 5 Another premise of justification
is that dominant parties will be constrained by market considerations in the
selection of form contract terms. Nevertheless, one must question whether,
from a societal standpoint, it is best that the legal relationship between
patient and physician be treated like the rental of a Ford Taurus at the Los
Angeles International Airport. Perhaps the focus should be on the ethical
considerations surrounding the doctor-patient relationship rather than de-
terminations based on all-encompassing legislation; the vagaries and fact
intensive determinations under common law contract theories of unscion-
ability, adhesion or public policy; or strained analogies to commercial law
rules.
The legal profession-which has at its core a relationship as sacrosanct
as that of physician-patient-has faced similar legal, ethical, and public pol-
icy questions regarding the use of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in attor-
ney-client agreements. In this context, the real work has come from the
consideration and application of the rules of professional conduct for law-
yers. The American Bar Association Committee on Ethics and Profes-
sional Responsibility has addressed this issue. It concluded that such
clauses are ethically permissible only if the lawyer fully apprises the client
of the advantages and disadvantages of arbitration so as to enable him or
her to give informed consent to the arbitral provision.126 The ABA Com-
mittee also opined that the rules of professional conduct preclude the use
of arbitration provisions to prospectively limit, in any way, the lawyer's
124. Irma S. Russell, Got Wheels?Article 2A, Standardized Rental Car Terms, Rational Inaction,
and Unilateral Private Ordering, 40 Lov. L.A. L. REV. 137, 165 (2006) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CoNrRACTS § 211 cmt. b. (1981)).
125. Id. at 164 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. a. (1981)).
126. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'1 Resp., Formal Op. 02-425 (2002). A number of state bar
committees on professional responsibility are in accord. See Stanley A. Leasure and Wayne L. Ander-
son, Arbitration of Attorney/Client Disputes: The Missouri Perspective, 64 J. Mo. BAR 238 (2008); Stan-
ley A. Leasure and Wayne L. Anderson, Disputes Between Attorneys and Clients in Oklahoma: A Role
for Arbitration?, 79 OKLA. B.J. 847 (2008).
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liability to the client. In addition, the Committee made clear that the law-
yer bears an affirmative ethical duty to discuss the advantages and disad-
vantages of binding arbitration with the client.127
There is nothing inherently evil about the inclusion of a provision for
binding arbitration in a contract between a competent patient and a medi-
cal care provider. The problem centers on the fundamental contract con-
cept of genuine assent. Assuming the patient is given an appropriate
explanation of the nature and effect of a binding arbitration clause in a
physician-patient agreement so as to allow an informed decision to be
made, there is no reason that the patient and the doctor should be denied
the opportunity to make the decision that arbitration meets their needs.
However, in light of the fact that the doctor, or other medical care pro-
vider, is typically in the dominant position, it is incumbent upon the medi-
cal care provider-bound by appropriately defined ethical obligations to
the patient-to exercise professional judgment in deciding when, and
under what circumstances it is possible to obtain the genuine assent of a
patient.
127. Id.
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